MIAMI — On May 7, the White House released the 2026 United States Counterterrorism Strategy — a 16-page document signed by President Trump that sets the formal doctrine for how Washington intends to use military, law enforcement, and intelligence tools against threats it considers existential. For the first time in the modern era of American counterterrorism, the document places the Western Hemisphere — not the Middle East, not Central Asia — at the top of the list.
Every government in Latin America is now operating inside that framework, whether they signed up for it or not.
What the Document Says
The strategy identifies three primary terrorism threats facing the United States.
The first, and explicitly the highest priority, is narcoterrorists and transnational criminal organizations operating in the Western Hemisphere. The second is legacy Islamist terrorist groups — al-Qaeda, ISIS and their affiliates. The third is what the administration calls violent left-wing extremists.
The language on cartels is direct and, for Latin American governments, consequential.
“We will continue our military and law enforcement campaigns against all the cartels and gangs designated as terrorist organizations,” the document states. “We will do so in concert with local governments when they are willing and able to work with us. If they cannot, or will not, we will still take whatever action is necessary to protect our country.”
That sentence — if they cannot, or will not, we will still act — is the one that matters. It removes the requirement for host-government consent as a precondition for U.S. operations. It is the legal and doctrinal cover for everything Washington has done in the region since September, and for anything it may do next.
Sebastian Gorka, the NSC senior director for counterterrorism who spearheaded the strategy, framed the shift in stark terms: more Americans have been killed by cartel-pushed illicit drugs than American service members have died in all conflicts since World War II combined. “Whether it is strangling their illicit funds, whether it is tracking their drug boats, we will not permit them to kill Americans on a massive scale,” he said.
The Operations Already Underway
The strategy is a formal codification of an operational posture that has been in place, and escalating, since last September.
Since the administration began striking suspected drug-trafficking vessels in Caribbean waters, U.S. military forces have conducted dozens of such strikes, killing at least 191 people.
The document claims maritime drug smuggling has dropped by more than 90% as a result — a figure the administration has not independently verified. A lawsuit filed in Massachusetts is now the first legal challenge to those strikes to land in a U.S. federal court, with plaintiffs arguing the operations amount to extrajudicial killings in sovereign international waters.
In January, Operation Absolute Resolve — cited by name and described as a “textbook Special Operations mission” in the document itself — captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas. The strategy holds the operation up as proof of concept: Washington identified a threat, assessed that the host government was complicit, and acted without Caracas’ consent.
The document also points to a 90% reduction in maritime drug smuggling as evidence that the strategy is working. Regional governments have raised concerns about the methodology behind that number, and independent analysis has not confirmed it.
Colombia & Mexico in the Crosshairs
Two countries are named specifically in the strategy’s Western Hemisphere section, and neither mention is complimentary.
For Mexico, the strategy calls for continued military and law enforcement campaigns against cartel networks, with or without cooperation from Mexico City. The threat has already materialized in legal form: a New York federal court indicted Sinaloa Governor Rubén Rocha Moya — now resigned — along with nine other state officials on drug trafficking charges. The indictment is a direct extension of the strategy’s approach: use the U.S. legal system to reach into Mexican political structures that Washington believes are cartel-compromised, with or without extradition cooperation.
For Colombia, the strategy arrives at a particularly sensitive moment. The country votes May 31 in a presidential election in which all major candidates except the Pacto Histórico’s Iván Cepeda have pledged to join the administration’s Americas Counter Cartel Coalition. Washington has sanctioned President Petro and revoked his visa over counternarcotics failures. If Cepeda wins — and current polls put him ahead — Colombia’s relationship with Washington enters genuinely uncharted territory: the U.S. strategy explicitly authorizes action against governments it deems complicit with or unwilling to act against cartels, and Cepeda has backed Petro’s total peace framework, which Washington has already deemed insufficient.
Cuba & the Broader Pattern
The strategy’s release last week — combined with the Pentagon updating contingency plans for Cuba and 25 surveillance flights off Havana since February — creates a coherent picture that Latin American analysts are now openly discussing: Washington is operating with a doctrine that gives it the legal and strategic justification to act unilaterally across the hemisphere, and it has demonstrated the willingness to use it.
Cuba fits the strategy’s framework precisely. The document targets “regimes who helped” cartels and characterizes Cuba as harboring Chinese and Russian intelligence. Secretary of State Rubio’s warning that Cuba faces “two paths: neither good” is not rhetorical — it reflects the strategy’s logic directly. Under the document’s terms, Havana’s refusal to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism objectives is itself grounds for escalation.
The same logic applies, to varying degrees, to Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega, to Haiti's ongoing state fragility, and to any government in the region that maintains close ties to designated organizations or their state sponsors.
The Regional Reaction
Latin American governments have responded to the strategy with a mixture of concern, calculation, and careful silence.
Brazil’s Lula government — which has consistently opposed unilateral U.S. military action in the hemisphere — has not issued a formal response to the document. With a national election in November and ongoing tariff negotiations with Washington, Brasília has strong incentives to avoid direct confrontation.
Argentina’s Milei government — among Washington’s closest regional ally — can be expected to align. Chile under Kast, inaugurated in March, has already pledged a more militarized approach to security that echoes the strategy’s priorities. Peru, in a post-election interregnum, is watching from the sidelines.
The document explicitly calls on regional partners to “bolster their own counterterrorism strategies” in alignment with Washington’s — language that functions simultaneously as an invitation and a warning. Countries that do not align risk being categorized alongside the non-cooperative governments the strategy says Washington will act against regardless.
What It Means for Miami’s Latin American Communities
For Latin Americans living in the United States — including the millions of Venezuelans, Colombians, Mexicans, Hondurans, and Cubans who make up the communities Sociedad Media covers — this strategy has direct implications.
The document’s reach extends beyond military operations. Cartel designations as foreign terrorist organizations affect how U.S. banks, businesses, and individuals can legally interact with entire sectors of the economies in countries where those groups operate. For the Colombian diaspora, it shapes the context of a presidential election three weeks away. For Venezuelans, it formalizes the doctrine behind Maduro’s capture and the ongoing transition. For Mexican-Americans with family ties to states like Sinaloa, where a sitting governor has now been federally indicted, it raises practical questions about travel, remittances, and business dealings.
The strategy also broadens the definition of who Washington considers a threat — from cartel operatives to the governments and institutions it deems complicit or uncooperative. Where exactly those lines are drawn, and how they are applied, will determine how the strategy lands in the countries and communities most directly affected by it.
Sociedad Media will continue to cover U.S.-Latin America relations and Washington’s interaction towards the region. Tips, sources, and feedback welcome at info@sociedadmedia.com
