When Colombians vote on June 21, they will not only be choosing a president, they will also be deciding the terms of one of Washington’s most strategically important bilateral relationships in the hemisphere — a partnership that under Gustavo Petro deteriorated from close alliance to open antagonism, and that a De La Espriella government would be expected to rebuild from the ground up.
The Trump administration has made its preferences clear through actions rather than words. The PCC and Comando Vermelho terrorist designations announced last Thursday — requested personally by Flávio Bolsonaro in a White House meeting — signal the kind of security-first, results-oriented relationship Washington wants across the region.
With Colombia, the stakes are even higher. The drug trade remains the central axis of the bilateral relationship. Colombia is still the world’s largest producer of cocaine, and U.S. counter-narcotics pressure will weigh heavily on the new leader, regardless of political party.
A Reset?
Here is what the reset could look like across five policy fronts:
- Coca Eradication — Back to Fumigation
The most immediate and concrete demand from Washington is a reversal of Petro’s coca eradication policy. Under the Petro government, the number of hectares of coca crop eradicated declined by 79.1% from 2022 to 2024.
The results were predictable. Under Petro, coca cultivation and cocaine production hit record highs as the government in Bogotá de-emphasized crop eradication.
De la Espriella on the other hand, has committed to reversing that trajectory aggressively.
“The first thing we have to do in order to retake control of security is to eradicate coca crops using different means, including fumigation. Cocaine is our worst cancer,” de la Espriella told Americas Quarterly in an interview in Bogotá.
With more than 262,000 hectares cultivated in 2024 — a record — Colombia’s cocaine production likely surpassed the 2,664 tons calculated by the United Nations for 2023, also a record high.
De la Espriella has endorsed aerial coca fumigation, a long-standing U.S. priority that Petro’s government abandoned entirely. The Trump administration’s 2026 National Drug Control Strategy identifies Colombia alongside Mexico as a priority country for reducing coca cultivation and disrupting cocaine networks — making fumigation resumption one of the clearest litmus tests for the new bilateral relationship.
- Extraditions — Restoring the Pipeline
De la Espriella has stressed his commitment to extradition. Under Petro, extraditions of high-value drug trafficking targets continued at a reduced pace even as the broader bilateral relationship deteriorated. A de la Espriella government would be expected to accelerate the pipeline — particularly for targets connected to the Gulf Clan and FARC dissident networks, which the Trump administration has designated as foreign terrorist organizations.
Colombia remains one of the most cooperative U.S. extradition partners, according to the State Department, even under Petro. Under de la Espriella, that cooperation would be expected to deepen significantly, with extradition potentially used as a tool to demonstrate early-term commitment to the bilateral relationship.
- China and the Belt and Road — Exiting the Alignment
One of the sharpest friction points in U.S.-Colombia relations under Petro was Bogotá’s decision to sign a cooperation agreement with Beijing under China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The move added a significant friction point to U.S.-Colombia relations.
A de la Espriella government on the other hand, would be expected to walk back that alignment and restore Colombia’s traditional posture as one of Washington’s closest hemispheric partners.
De la Espriella wants the country to have stronger ties with the U.S., both to fight drug trafficking and promote investment. In practical terms, that likely means declining to deepen Belt and Road commitments, restricting Chinese telecommunications infrastructure contracts, and aligning Colombia’s trade and investment posture more closely with Washington’s critical minerals agenda.
- The Shield of the Americas — Joining the Security Framework
Both Paloma Valencia and de la Espriella have proposed including Colombia in the Shield of the Americas, the security framework created by the Trump administration, and have engaged directly with administration officials and Republican members of Congress.
Both right-wing candidates also indicated favor toward Colombia’s inclusion in the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition, an alliance launched in March by a group of Trump-aligned countries. Membership in both frameworks would represent a formal institutional reintegration of Colombia into Washington’s regional security architecture — a significant reversal from Petro's deliberate distancing from U.S. security initiatives.
The Shield of the Americas framework carries particular weight in the context of Venezuela. A Colombia aligned with Washington on security would give the U.S. a critical land border with Venezuela — the longest in South America — from which to maintain pressure on the Maduro government and monitor cross-border criminal networks.
- Critical Minerals — The New Economic Axis
Beyond security, Washington has a growing economic interest in Colombia’s mineral wealth. Washington will expect the incoming administration to cooperate on a range of issues including migration, access to critical minerals, and drug policy.
Colombia holds significant reserves of nickel, cobalt, lithium, and rare earth elements — resources that have become central to U.S. industrial and defense supply chain strategy.
De la Espriella supports fracking, new oil contracts, and cutting taxes for the private sector — a posture that aligns directly with Washington’s interest in expanding energy and mineral cooperation with allied governments across the hemisphere.
The Limits of the Reset
A de la Espriella victory does not guarantee an frictionless relationship. Washington can flex its institutional relationships and financial support to promote its interests in Colombia’s main judicial and security bodies regardless of who wins. And the structural challenges of Colombia’s security situation — 262,000 hectares of coca, a fractured peace process, and armed groups with deep territorial roots — will not be solved by a change in government.
U.S.-Colombian relations deteriorated sharply under Petro. In September 2025, President Trump determined that Colombia had failed its counternarcotics commitments. The State Department revoked Petro’s visa. The Treasury Department sanctioned Petro under counternarcotics authorities. Those sanctions remain in place. Whether they are lifted under a de la Espriella government — and how quickly — will be one of the earliest signals of how deep the reset actually runs.
The window opens on June 21.
